This paper studies perquisites of major company CEOs, focusing on personal use of company planes. For firms that have disclosed this managerial benefit, average shareholder returns underperform market benchmarks by more than 4 percent annually, a severe gap far exceeding the costs of resources consumed. Around the date of the initial disclosure, firms' stock prices drop by an average of 1.1 percent. Regression analysis finds no significant associations between CEOs' perquisites and their compensation or percentage ownership, but variables related to personal CEO characteristics, especially long-distance golf club memberships, have significant explanatory power for personal aircraft use.
Introduction
This paper studies perquisite consumption by executives of major corporations, with a focus on CEOs' personal use of company aircraft. Perks have long been identified as a source of agency costs between shareholders and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) , and corporate jets regularly inspire criticisms of managerial excess by journalists and shareholder activists. Data presented below indicate that personal aircraft use represents by far the most costly fringe benefit enjoyed by major company CEOs.
The central result of this study is that CEOs' personal use of company aircraft is associated with severe and significant under-performance of their employers' stocks. Firms that permit personal aircraft use by the CEO under-perform market benchmarks by about 4 percent or 400 basis points per year, after controlling for a standard range of risk, size and other factors.
This result proves robust to a wide range of alternative performance measures and additional controls.
I find that shareholders react negatively when firms first disclose that their CEO has been awarded the aircraft perk, as stock prices fall by an abnormal 1.1 percent around the time of the relevant SEC filings. While this reduction in market value is significant, it does not appear to anticipate the full extent by which such companies' stocks will on average under-perform the market in the future.
The inverse relation between CEO aircraft use and company performance appears much larger than could be explained by the direct cost of the resources consumed. One might conjecture that CEOs who consume excessive perks may be less likely to work hard, less protective of the company's assets, or more likely to tolerate bloated or inefficient cost structures. Some regression evidence, presented at the end of the paper, supports this last possibility. High executive perks might also represent a symptom of weak corporate governance, which in turn could cause firms to perform poorly over time.
To understand more clearly the role of perquisites in managerial compensation, the paper presents regression models that show associations between CEO aircraft use and a range of variables measuring corporate attributes and personal CEO characteristics. The results exhibit only weak consistency with the leading financial theories of management perquisites, which appear in classic studies of organizational structure by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama 2 A branch of the Management literature also analyzes perquisites as motivational tools, based upon their function as indicators of status within a firm. Rajan and Wulf (2004) test several empirical implications of this theory, using data that measures the depth and breadth of a firm's organizational structure. 3 Jensen and Meckling state that in their analysis, perk consumption can be viewed as a representative example of the numerous ways in which agency problems can arise between a manager and shareholders, such as shirking or risk avoidance on the part of the manager.
(1980).
2 Jensen and Meckling (1976) use perquisite consumption by managers as the basis for their formal model of the agency costs of outside equity in a public corporation. 3 They observe that when an owner-manager sells stock to the public and reduces his ownership below 100%, incentives increase for the manager to expend corporate resources for personal benefit. "As the owner-manager's fraction of the equity falls, his fractional claim on the outcomes falls and this will tend to encourage him to appropriate larger amounts of corporate resources in the form of perquisites," the authors write (p. 313). This diversion of resources from the company to the manager is viewed by the authors as a pure reduction in the value of the firm. A clear prediction of Jensen and Meckling's model is that perk consumption by a CEO should vary inversely with his fractional ownership. Two further variables that should affect perk consumption, the authors continue, are a manager's personal tastes and the difficulty of monitoring the manager's actions. Fama (1980) views perquisites more benignly, essentially arguing that "consumption on the job" by managers amounts to a form of compensation that can be offset through adjustments in salary or other forms of pay. Fama describes the interaction between managers and their boards of directors in terms of a dynamic of "ex post settling up," in which the manager's wage is regularly revised to account for his performance and his personal consumption of company resources. Fama's model implies that perk consumption represents an agency cost only to the extent that its value exceeds the subsequent penalties to the manager from ex post settling up wage discounts. Fama's theory, then, appears to predict an inverse association between perk consumption and compensation, controlling for other attributes that affect compensation such as industry, performance, and experience. Like Jensen and Meckling, Fama also suggests that managerial tastes and the difficulty of monitoring will affect managers' perquisites.
My regression analysis provides only modest support for either the Jensen-Meckling or Further regression results indicate that CEOs' personal characteristics such as age, education and political affiliation have significant explanatory power for patterns of personal corporate jet use and other perk consumption. The CEO's golfing habits have especially strong associations with personal aircraft use; if the CEO belongs to a golf club that is located a long distance from headquarters, his personal use of company aircraft increases significantly.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a description of the data. Section III contains a regression analysis of patterns of CEO's personal aircraft use.
Section IV analyzes the stock market performance of firms that do and do not permit personal use of company planes by their managers, presenting both event-study and long-run portfolio evidence. Section V briefly compares the study's results for aircraft use and other perquisites.
Section VI concludes.
II.

Data description
Data for this study is drawn from a panel of 237 large companies over the ten-year period Institutional investors own about 60 percent of the stock of a typical firm. Institutional ownership concentration is measured as the ratio of the five largest institutional positions divided by total institutional ownership, a statistic found by Hartzell and Starks (2003) to have positive associations with various measures of management incentives. The IRRC database's governance index counts the number of takeover defenses and other anti-shareholder provisions in a firm's charter and bylaws, following Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) , who find this index to have negative associations with a company's stock market performance.
I tabulate data for aircraft ownership and companies' proximity to airports from databases maintained by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration. For each company I record whether headquarters lies within one hour's drive of a Tier I, Tier II or Tier III airport, according to FAA classifications of commercial airport use based on traffic for 2001. Tier I airports, the largest "hub" facilities, are within an hour's drive of nearly two-thirds of sample companies. Hersch and McDougall (1992) , in a study of corporate aircraft fleets, find that companies are less likely to own or lease their own planes if headquarters is near a major commercial airport. The dummy variable for coastal location, which equals one if the firm is near the east or west coast of the continental U.S., is also tabulated because of results from that study, which found that firms with geographically interior locations were more likely to acquire private aircraft. Data on CEO perk consumption has not been tabulated by any on-line source, and for this study I obtain it by reading annual proxy statements for each of the observations in the sample.
Perk data has been disclosed in proxy statements since 1993, generally in a footnote to column (e) of the Summary Compensation Table, headed "Other Annual Compensation." Following the SEC's proxy disclosure regulations, this column includes "the dollar value of other annual compensation not properly classified as salary or bonus," with "perquisites and other personal benefits" as one of several mandatory items that are combined into an aggregate total. These regulations became effective at the end of 1992, and most companies began applying them to their proxy filings in 1993. The SEC's EDGAR database, the central source for electronically filed proxies, has coverage that begins one year later, for proxies filed in 1994 and after, which accounts for the cutoff date for the sample in this study.
5 Disclosure regulations appear in 17 CFR 228.402, "Executive Compensation," and the regulations for perk disclosure are in §228.402(b)(2)(iii)(C). The original draft of the disclosure regulations set the overall threshold at the lesser of $25,000 or 10 percent of total cash compensation, and required itemization of every perk received, regardless of amount, if the overall threshold were exceeded. See SEC Release No. 33-6940, 34-30851 (June 23, 1992) . The overall limit was raised to $50,000 "to reflect inflation," while the requirement to itemize each category was dropped without explanation. See SEC Release 33-6962, 34-31327 (October 16, 1992) .
10
SEC regulations specify minimum thresholds for perk disclosure, and these thresholds complicate data collection. The total value of perks must be disclosed based upon their "aggregate incremental cost" to the company, but only if the total exceeds the lesser of $50,000 or 10 percent of the executive's salary plus bonus (for all but 63 observations in my sample, the CEO earns $500,000 or more in salary plus bonus). In such cases, the total cost of perks may not be directly observed, because many companies disclose the perk total only after aggregating it with other data items reportable in the same column of the table, such as above-market interest on deferred compensation and income tax reimbursements. A further requirement is that the company must itemize the cost of any individual perk, such as personal aircraft use, if it exceeds 25 percent of the overall perk total, assuming that the total exceeds the $50,000 threshold.
5
Firms' compliance with this itemization requirement provides the data used in this study.
The structure of the SEC's disclosure rules cause data for CEOs' personal aircraft use to be censored. Assuming the CEO earns at least $500,000 salary plus bonus, firms never have to disclose aircraft use if its cost lies below $12,500 (equal to 25 percent of the $50,000 overall threshold), and will have to disclose values above $12,500 only to the extent that other perk consumption is not large enough to reduce aircraft use to below 25 percent of the overall perk total. Inspection of the data indicates that other categories of perks rarely exceed aircraft use, so one can conclude that in the large majority of cases, values above $50,000 will be disclosed.
Values between $12,500 and $50,000 will be disclosed to the extent that the CEO receives enough other perks to surpass the $50,000 overall threshold.
From reading a large number of proxy statements, it is evident that several disclosure loopholes limit the transparency of perk consumption data. A CEO who makes significant use of a corporate plane for personal travel may nevertheless avoid disclosure under one or more of the following scenarios:
• The company may incur slightly less than $50,000 incremental cost for aircraft use by the CEO and make no other perks available to the CEO, meaning that no disclosure at all is required.
• The CEO may receive perks in five or more categories in roughly equal proportions, so that none accounts for 25 percent of the overall total. In this case only the total value of all perks must be disclosed.
• The CEO may receive very large perks in one category other than aircraft use, so that only that category is disclosed. This is common when new CEOs receive relocation expense reimbursements, which can be large.
• The company may aggressively classify certain types of income as "perquisites" and count it toward the overall threshold, allowing it to itemize only those categories if they are large enough and thereby obscure the consumption of other perks. Some companies appear to have adopted this practice with such financial items as retirement contributions and insurance policy payments, which are more properly viewed as tax and income deferral strategies rather than perquisites.
• The company may choose not to classify personal aircraft use as a perquisite if at least some part of a plane trip involves business. Table II presents data about disclosures of CEO perquisites, and the reader is reminded again that the data are subject to censoring due to the SEC's regulations. The SEC provides no guidance about how companies should calculate the "incremental cost" of benefits such as aircraft use, meaning that different firms likely use different methods to produce the data that are disclosed to shareholders. Perks are rank-ordered in Table II according to the frequency of their disclosure in the sample. Companies use certain euphemisms to describe personal aircraft use, 6 A few companies in the sample, apparently at a loss for how to measure the incremental cost of aircraft use, instead report the value of each executive's plane use according to Internal Revenue Service guidelines for imputing taxable personal income to an employee who travels for personal reasons on corporate aircraft. These complex regulations, known as the Standard Industry Fare Level or SIFL rules, appear in IRS Regulation §1.61-21(g) and are based upon certain multiples of estimated cost per mile flown. The SEC rarely acts against companies for failing to comply with perquisite and other compensation disclosure requirements. In probably the only such case to date, the Commission's staff in August 2004 recommended sanctioning Tyson Foods Inc. for not disclosing a wide range of perks, including air travel, obtained between 1997 and 2003 by founder and former CEO Don Tyson. Even if Tyson did not completely disclose perquisites, its executives still ranked among the most prolific personal aircraft users in the sample for this paper.
7 Some idea of the scale of censoring of the perquisite data in Table II can be inferred by a comparison of the table with confidential survey data summarized in Rajan and Wulf (2004, p. 13, footnote 15) . Those authors study a comparable sample of 300 large firms that have mean annual sales of $7.8 billion. A consulting firm's survey of CEO perks in those companies found that 38 percent of CEOs had access to company cars while 47 percent had club memberships paid for by the firm. In my sample only 6 perecent of CEOs have disclosed company cars while 2 percent 12 such as "travel expense" and "corporate transportation." I generally assume that such language refers to airplane or helicopter travel rather than limousines, trains, or boats, unless disclosures indicate otherwise. In some cases the company lists travel expenses for the CEO's spouse or tax reimbursements for income imputed to the CEO related to corporate aircraft use; I tabulate these as part of the CEO's overall aircraft use totals. The minimum values for items listed in each row of Table II indicate that some firms voluntarily disclose perk costs even when they fall below the SEC's thresholds, but these disclosures represent only a small part of the sample. Since the disclosures are based upon the incremental cost of perks, they would not capture the full cost of providing certain services to CEOs, as items such as amortization of an aircraft's acquisition cost wouldn't properly be viewed as incremental.
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Data in Table II indicate that aircraft use is by far the largest disclosed CEO perk, appearing more than twice as often as the next most popular item, financial counseling, which includes tax preparation, estate planning, and the cost of representation in contract negotiations.
Company cars, country club memberships, medical reimbursements (above the firm's regular health insurance), and personal security also appear on the list of perks in Table II. 7 I do not have disclosed club memberships. The median value of these perks was $17.6 and $3.7 thousand, repsectively, in the Rajan and Wulf sample, compared to median values of $16.0 and $24.7 in my sample. One could therefore infer that country club dues are almost always too small to trigger disclosure in proxy statements (most disclosures appear to be for initiation fees and not annual dues), while company cars are generally disclosed only if another, larger perk such as aircraft use is also reported. Unfortunately the Rajan and Wulf data for CEO aircraft use reflects a combined value for business and personal use and not personal use by itself, so it cannot be compared with the data in this paper.
13 tabulate moving and relocation expenses, which can be very large and exceed aircraft use for some firms. Inspection of the data indicate that moving expenses are overwhelmingly concentrated among executives who are posted overseas for temporary assignments or who relocate after being recruited from outside the firm (some also relocate if headquarters is shifted due to a merger or other event). I also do not tabulate data for perks that are strictly financial and appear to represent tax deferral strategies, such as split-dollar life insurance or pension plan contributions. Since that time commercial air travel has become more costly and less convenient, and some 8 Such a perception would probably be misplaced. Data tabulated by the National Business Aviation Association indicate that while the total accident rate per flight hour is comparable for corporate and commercial flights, corporate aviation has a much higher fatal accident rate. If the data were recalculated per passenger mile flown, they would skew more dramatically in favor of commercial aviation, since commercial aircraft carry more passengers and travel at greater speeds. See www.nbaa.org/basics/safety/background.htm and Carley (1997).
14 CEOs or their boards may perceive corporate jets as safer than commercial ones. 8 A handful of proxy statement disclosures, even some before the terrorist attacks, indicate that for security reasons, the board requires the CEO to use corporate aircraft for personal travel (this "requirement" is sometimes negotiated as part of a CEO's employment contract). 
III Determinants of CEOs' personal use of aircraft
Data for CEOs' personal aircraft use has many zero-valued observations, since not every firm has a corporate jet or permits its executives to use it as a perk. Additionally, the previous section describes how the SEC's proxy regulations lead to censoring of the data for actual aircraft use when it falls below the threshold required for disclosure. Given these properties of the data, I rely on a Tobit regression model to analyze how the cost of CEO aircraft use in each firm-year is related to a range of explanatory variables. The main purpose of this analysis is to evaluate whether perquisite data conform to the Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama (1980) theories of perk consumption. Finally, the regression models include control variables for company size, measured as the log of sales; leverage, measured as long-term debt over total assets; and a time trend, measured as the difference between the year and 1993. Company size is used by Rajan and Wulf (2004) as one proxy for the extent to which perks might be used as indicators of status within an organization. Leverage might be important if it creates performance pressure that leads to agency cost reduction such as lower perk consumption by managers. Estimates for the excess compensation residual are negative for both dependent variables but without statistical significance. The negative signs provide some support for Fama's (1980) theory about perk consumption, since they imply that a CEO's compensation is adjusted downward when his perk consumption increases. However, the marginal effect of the estimated coefficient is small. Based upon the partial derivative of the likelihood function, the marginal effect is very close to -0.00008, implying that an additional $1,000 in personal aircraft use by the CEO leads to a reduction in compensation of 8 cents, an economically negligible amount; the estimate for all other types of perk consumption has even lower magnitude. These estimates are far too small to support explanations for perk consumption that rely on marginal tax differentials between the firm and CEO (a theory also rejected by Rajan and Wulf (2004) ) or the CEO placing a personal value on perks that exceeds the firm's cost of providing them.
The CEO ownership variable has positive rather than negative estimates in both models, providing no evidence of the predicted negative association with perk consumption. As a sensitivity check of the results I use an alternative piecewise ownership specification with two breakpoints, following Mørck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) I check the importance of the choice of estimation framework by fitting a variety of alternative regression models. These include ordinary least squares, OLS with both fixed effects and random effects, and a probit-Tobit two stage sample selection model. Apart from minor differences in the sign and significance of certain control variables, the basic results are unchanged from those shown in Table III . The estimates for the compensation and ownership variables are insignificant and close to zero in every model, and the significant association of aircraft use with CEO age, education, and golfing persists across all models.
IV CEO aircraft use and company stock returns
This section studies the association between CEOs' personal use of company aircraft and firms' stock returns. Section A presents event study evidence of how stock prices react when a CEO's aircraft use is first disclosed. Section B presents long-term stock return evidence about the performance of firms that permit personal CEO aircraft use. Section C contains sensitivity tests of the results in Section B. .Section D presents evidence about the operating performance of these firms.
A. Event study evidence
To evaluate shareholder reactions to CEOs' personal use of corporate aircraft, I study abnormal stock price changes when proxy statements are published disclosing that companies have begun granting this fringe benefit. Abnormal stock returns are calculated using standard A loss of 1.1 percent in market capitalization is worth about $75 million for the median firm in the sample, far in excess of the disclosed incremental cost to the company of a CEO's personal aircraft use. However, the incremental cost does not include amortization of the aircraft itself, and a top-of-the-line corporate jet can cost $35 million or more. If shareholders view the entire corporate aviation activity of a firm as a deadweight cost that yields no compensating benefits, and if one factors in additional costs for storage, maintenance, fuel, and operation of the plane, then the dollar loss in shareholder wealth could approximate the true present value cost to the firm of acquiring an aircraft and making it available to the CEO for both business and personal travel.
The CAR results indicate that shareholders do not welcome the news that firms permit CEOs to use corporate aircraft for personal travel. Table IV includes two decompositions of the results. In Panel A, the result for the overall sample of 85 firms is divided into two pieces: 54 firms for which the aircraft disclosure was the first executive perk ever disclosed to shareholders, and the remaining 31 firms, all of which had previously disclosed other perks such as company cars or country club memberships. Though the difference is not statistically significant, the CARs have much greater magnitude for the sub-sample that had not previously disclosed any perks, consistent with an interpretation that earlier perk disclosures by a company signal some probability of future personal aircraft use. Abnormal returns for the earlier, initial disclosures of other types of perks by the 31 firms were not significantly different from zero, however.
Panel B in the lower half of Table IV personal CEO aircraft use for 15.4 percent of the sample observations. In another 3.6 percent of cases, a different top 5 executive has disclosed aircraft use while the CEO does not. I assume that the board is unlikely to make a perk available to other managers without also awarding it to the CEO, so I also code those observations as 1, raising the sample mean to 19.0 percent. In these cases, I reason that the CEO is likely using the aircraft as well but at a level that falls below the SEC's disclosure thresholds. Other explanatory variables in the regression include an intercept, the return on the CRSP value-weighted market index, differential returns on portfolios of growth stocks compared to value stocks, and the differential returns on portfolios of small capitalization stocks compared to large cap stocks. Data for these market factors are obtained from Ken French's web site. The risk-free rate is subtracted from both the dependent variable and the market index. In the left column of Table V , the aircraft dummy variable has a coefficient of -4.54
percentage points with a t-statistic significant at levels below 1 percent. This result indicates that firms with CEO aircraft use under-perform the market by more than 400 basis points per year, equal to a shortfall of about $300 million in market capitalization each year for the median sample firm. Figure 3 shows abnormal stock returns for companies before and after the first year in which personal CEO aircraft use is disclosed. The figure shows that firms adopting a policy that permits CEO aircraft use perform well prior to awarding this perk, and exceptionally well in the year just before the perk is granted, with abnormal stock performance of almost +5 percent.
These data suggest that perhaps the aircraft use is provided as a reward to the managers of strongly performing firms. In the first year in which CEOs are permitted to use aircraft for personal travel, company performance plummets, to an abnormal return of -8 percent. It improves somewhat but remains poor in all subsequent years.
C. Long-term stock performance: Sensitivity tests (i) Additional controls
In the other columns of et. al (2003) . However, its estimate is not significant. The dummy variable for older Fortune 500 firms is also negative as expected, indicating that other sample firms that rose up to join the Fortune 500 after 1996 were superior market performers compared to firms that remained in the index for the entire period.
(ii) Alternate variable definitions and estimation methods The main conclusions of the paper are little affected by this range of alternative models.
Estimated coefficients for the aircraft variable in Table VI are In further analysis that is untabulated, I estimate weighted least squares regressions of the same models in Table V , using market capitalization at the start of the year as the weight.
Coefficient estimates are even more negative than for these weighted least squares estimates than Table I ).
In Table VII I re-estimate the regressions from Table V and include an indicator variable for firms that are aircraft operators but have never disclosed personal use by the CEO or another executive. Results are shown in the second column; for comparison purposes, the first column shows the model estimated with a dummy variable that equals 1 for years in which personal aircraft use is disclosed for an executive. In contrast to the negative and significant estimate in the left column, the estimate the second column is positive though not significant. The difference between the estimates for the dummy variables in columns 1 and 2 is significant below the 1 percent level.
(iv) Other perquisite categories
The third column of Table VII includes regression estimates that investigate the relation between company performance and other executive perks. The indicator variable in the third column is set equal to 1 for years in which at least one executive has other disclosed perks, such as a company car or country club membership, but no disclosed aircraft use. The estimate for this variable is negative but not significant. I also estimate separate regressions using dummy variables for each of the five perquisites listed in Table II . Four of the five dummy variables have negative estimates, with country club memberships the most negative.
D. Operating performance
Results above highlight the under-performance in the stock market of firms that permit CEOs to use company aircraft for personal travel. Given that these performance shortfalls equal hundreds of millions of dollars per company per year, it would be difficult to argue that the direct costs of perk consumption alone could explain the gap.
Although many explanations could account for the poor performance of firms with CEOs who exhibit high perk consumption, one clear possibility is that these managers run their firms inefficiently, tolerating waste, excess overhead, or uncompetitive cost structures. Table VIII presents regression estimates that provide some evidence consistent with this possibility. I regress firms' sales per employee against the aircraft dummy variable from Table V , as well as dummy variables for industries and years. Both random effects and fixed effects estimates are reported. The results show a strong, significant negative association between the aircraft variable and sales per employee, indicating that firms with high CEO perquisites tend to be overstaffed relative to the competition, achieving about $25,000 less in sales per employee.
However, similar regressions using return on assets as the dependent variable do not yield significant results. Table 9 presents a summary of evidence about the personal aircraft perquisite, in the left column, compared to all other types of perks, which are analyzed as a group in the right column.
V Personal aircraft use compared to other perquisites
Together, the evidence suggests that the incidence and stock price associations of other perks occur in patterns reasonably similar, albeit not as dramatic, as the effects associated with personal aircraft use. Table IV is used).
Abnormal stock price reactions are lower in each column when perks are disclosed, though the differences with non-disclosures are not statistically significant. Finally, the bottom row of the table reproduces the regression coefficient estimates and t-statistics from the first and third columns of Table VII . These indicate negative stock performance in years in which executives receive either type of perk, though the estimate for aircraft use is larger in magnitude than for all other perks.
Two possible explanations might account for the disparities in stock price associations for aircraft use compared to other perks. First, data for other perks is almost certainly censored more heavily than for aircraft use, since cars, club memberships, and the like are not as expensive as jet airplanes. If so, the perk indicator variable in the annual stock performance regressions may be measured with greater error, leading to an estimate with a magnitude that is too low. Additionally, aircraft use may be associated with more serious management or governance problems than other perks, due to its sheer expense and degree of conspicuousness;
an executive who has the company acquire an automobile for his use may not be shirking or sending adverse signals to other workers to quite the same degree as when has the company acquire an aircraft.
VI Conclusions
This paper studies perquisite consumption by CEOs in major companies, focusing on personal use of company aircraft, the most costly and frequently disclosed managerial fringe benefit. Data indicate that more than 30 percent of Fortune 500 CEOs in 2002 were permitted to use company planes for personal travel, up from a frequency below 10 percent a decade earlier.
The most striking results in the paper concern the association between CEO perk consumption and company performance. When personal aircraft use by CEOs is first disclosed to shareholders, company stock prices drop by about 1.1 percent. However, this value loss does not fully anticipate the future poor performance of such companies. Regression analysis indicates that firms permitting CEO aircraft use under-perform market benchmarks by about 400 basis points per year, a severe shortfall that cannot be explained simply by the costs of the resources consumed. Further analysis indicates that firms in this category have excess staffing relative to their counterparts.
Regression models of CEO personal aircraft do not show significant associations with compensation, ownership, or monitoring variables as predicted by theory. However, variables measuring personal characteristics of CEOs, such as age, political affiliation, and education, have marked associations with perk consumption. Especially strong associations appear to exist between personal aircraft use and a CEO's golfing activity, as an indicator variable for longdistance golf club memberships has strong magnitude and significance.
working paper, University of Pennsylvania. Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
Table V Regression estimates of stock performance as function of executives' personal aircraft use
Ordinarily least squares regression of companies' annual stock returns. The sample includes 220 large firms between 1993 and 2002. The dependent variable is the raw stock return minus the risk-free rate. The principal explanatory variable is an indicator for whether the company makes aircraft available for personal use by the CEO or another top 5 executive and discloses this benefit in the proxy statement filed at the end of the fiscal year. Other explanatory variables include the Fama-French (1993) factors for excess return on the stock market (value-weighted), excess return for value stocks compared to growth stocks, excess return for small stocks compared to large stocks; the Carhart (1997) factor for excess return of rising stocks compared to falling stocks; the Gompers-Ishii-Metrick (2003) Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. Fama-French (1993) regressions identical to the left column of Table V . The dotted line shows mean abnormal returns for 104 companies that begin permitting personal use of aircraft during the sample period, with data tabulated for different periods relative to the first year of disclosed use.
